WSI Brussels Blog

‘It is clear that the budgetary situation concerning the equipment of our forces makes the construction of a second aircraft carrier difficult,’ French Defence Minister Hervé Morin told Europe 1 radio and the TV5 Monde television channel on April 20th.
‘It’s a decision that we will have to take in the coming weeks,’ he said, adding: ‘The President of the Republic will decide.’ Morin’s announcement strengthens the recent insistent rumours that suggested that one of the Marine nationale’s leading programs is indeed to be shelved.

Since the retirement of the ‘Clemenceau’ in 1997, the ‘Charles de Gaulle’ is now the only serving French aircraft carrier (if we except the ‘Jeanne d’Arc’ helicopter cruiser) and is also the country’s first nuclear-powered surface vessel. Announced by Nicolas Sarkozy during his electoral campaign in February 2007, the construction of a second aircraft carrier would have allowed the French Navy to keep an operational presence in the seas when the ‘Charles de Gaulle’ was in harbour for maintenance. One of Mr. Sarkozy’s close collaborators recently recalled the President’s attachment to the project, which he considered to be ‘reasonable’ and to be ‘an operational and political obviousness.’

Since coming to power however, Sarkozy has become more evasive on the matter and now says he will await the conclusions of the Commission writing the ‘Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité’. This document will set France’s defence orientations for the next 15 years and is to be released in June, two months later than expected. According to some reports, many members of the Commission appear hostile to the second aircraft carrier project.

With an initial cost estimated at between 2 and 3 billion Euros, the PA2 project (for ‘porte-avions 2’) now looks likely to come in at nearly 3.5 billion ($5.5 billion) according to a French parliamentary document published last February. Currently, both the French Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defence are reportedly convinced that – given the present state of public finances – the burden of funding the construction of the second aircraft carrier is too heavy.

Some problems might also come from the military itself. For instance the Army and the Air force, as well as the General Chief of Staff are said to be strongly opposed to the program, since in case of a green light they would have to accept fresh sacrifices in terms of reducing troop numbers and closing several bases.

Moreover, although some Navy officers claim the new carrier would be ‘no luxury’ and that it is a fully compatible tool with the ‘Charles de Gaulle’ and the Rafale Marine aircraft (despite the fact it would have to share these with the other carrier), the Navy itself is more divided that it appears. Many sailors are aware that the second aircraft carrier program would lead to the sacrifice of new submarines and frigates (reducing orders of the French-Italian Fremm program, as only 8 have been ordered so far although a number of 17 was initially planned) widely considered to be the backbone of any modern navy. They also do not welcome any decision that would lead to a navy with a few big vessels but nothing much else.

This problem is far from new for the Navy Staff: during the set up of the then-aborted defence planning law in 2001-2002, they had to postpone construction of a second aircraft carrier in order to save frigates and submarines. At the time, it was determined that the carrier program would be launched again ‘as soon as the economic situation would permit’. The second time around, France seems to be heading to the same solution.

Quite where that leaves Britain is anyone’s guess, since the French have committed themselves to a programme of technical and industrial cooperation with the British for the production of aircraft carriers: they were indeed supposed to do a joint design, and possibly to share construction of conventionally-powered carriers – since nuclear propulsion would be costly to develop, operate and maintain - driving down costs by producing three hulls instead of two (as well as steam catapults, some of which have already been produced and paid by the French government). That the French are even thinking of cancellation, however, might rather reinforce any British suspicions that Sarkozy’s European defence integration project is something of a paper tiger. As long ago as the 2003 Le Touquet summit Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac reaffirmed their Saint-Malo commitment to be able to maintain one battle-ready aircraft carrier group at sea at all times. This was supposed to be in place by 2008. The Royal Navy is presently deploying two aircraft carriers, ‘HMS Ark Royal’ and ‘HMS Illustrious’ (plus one put in reserve until 2010), and has planned to build two more under the British-French agreement. However with France currently operating just one carrier it looks that the plans hatched by Blair and Chirac could come to naught.

A definitive answer on the second carrier project would certainly be much appreciated at the Saint-Nazaire shipyard where the vessel is supposed to be assembled. They are awaiting an answer before this summer or they will not be able to do the work, since they have many others contracts and their order book is filled for several years.

Despite any probable delay, the second aircraft carrier program is not yet officially abandoned. Some sources indicate that there are several options aside from cancelling the project or starting construction right away:

1) The first possibility lies in postponing the project by the end of the next defence planning law for 2009-2013. In that case, the new aircraft carrier would obviously not be operational by 2015 or 2016, a time when the ‘Charles de Gaulle’ will again be confined to port for about 18 months for maintenance and to renew its nuclear fuel.

In the meantime, France could decide to make a common use of its Fleet Air Arm (FAA) alongside its British counterparts, since the UK is about to begin the construction of the two aircraft carriers that share technology with the French project. According to some sources, British aircraft carriers could sail with a French escort and vice-versa, marking another step in the making of a truly common European defence. One indication that this option might be followed lies in the French-British summit of March 27th where the two countries agreed to intensify their cooperation in the field of defence. More details on the precise nature of this cooperation should be given in July, when France takes over the EU Presidency.

2) The second option – that does not appear to be very popular amongst political leaders - would be to raise funding through a privatization program in order to avoid financial problems across the rest of the French defence budget. This currently stands at 48 billion Euros - that include 16 billion allocated to the arms programmes. However, to fulfil its other existing arms programmes (the acquisition of equipment such as Rafale aircraft, M-51 missiles, NH-90 and Tiger helicopters, Fremm frigates, Barracuda submarines,A 400 M aircrafts, and armoured vehicles), France should increase its defence budget by 40% between 2009 and 2013, which is most unlikely. Ordering a new aircraft carrier at such a time might not be the most prudent move. But the partial privatization programme not being very popular has a good reason: it is rumoured that it could target the Areva company, the French public multinational industrial conglomerate that deals in energy, especially nuclear power. The company, that is spread worldwide, is a source of much of France’s industrial pride. However, although politically sensitive, the privatization idea is nonetheless said to be being seriously considered.

One aircraft carrier alone is not enough to maintain a reliable Fleet Air Arm, since at least one carrier must always be available at sea when the other(s) are undergoing maintenance. In this regard, unless they work with another European power such as the UK, France might be better having two or no carriers. Regardless, Nicolas Sarkozy will have to decide relatively quickly as France’s credibility as an important maritime power is at stake as a time when he is striving to cast the country – and the EU - as a bigger player on the international stage.